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“let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who 
shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan,…”
1 
 




1. Veterans' Benefits by War
2 
 
  This paper compares veterans' benefits across America's nineteenth-century wars and 
explores the determinants of the level of benefits. These comparisons are based on new estimates of 
the number of pensions, the value of cash pensions, and the amount and value of land grants. The 
amount of benefits, it turns out, varied substantially from war to war and depended on several factors 
– the wealth of the United States, the previous history of veterans' benefits, the number of veterans 
relative to the general population, lobbying by agents for the veterans, and so on. Perhaps the most 
important factor, however, was the state of the federal treasury. Veterans’ benefits were, to use the 
term somewhat freely, a luxury: When the federal treasury was in the black demands for additional 
benefits were approved; when it was in the red demands for additional benefits were denied. 
  By veterans’ benefits we mean simply money or other assets paid to former members of the 
armed forces. In many cases benefits were simply cash paid to a veteran, often in the veteran's old 
age, or to the veteran's widow or children. In-kind benefits, however, were important in some cases. 
Land grants were important before the Civil War. Old soldier's homes, as they were termed, have 
been important since the Civil War, although facilities for retired army and naval personnel were 
established earlier. Health care provided through the veterans system has been important since the 
First World War, although military hospitals were sometimes pressed into service even earlier. 
                                                 
1 From Lincoln's second inaugural, this statement became the motto of the Veterans Department. 
 
2 The idea for this paper emerged from a conversation that one of us had many years ago with Lawrence Fisher of 
Rutgers University, Newark.    4
Educational benefits were first provided, as far as we are aware, for veterans of World War I and 
became famous with the GI bill for veterans of World War II. Veterans have also been the 
beneficiaries of veterans' preference laws that give veterans a leg up in the pursuit of civil service 
jobs. Private firms could also introduce a preference for veterans.  Here we will focus on the 
amounts spent by the federal government for cash payments and the amount and value of the land 
grants. Although it is hard to be certain, we believe that our totals include the great bulk of benefits 
paid to America's veterans in the nineteenth century. 
  Since benefits were paid after, sometimes long after, a war ended and the veteran returned to 
civilian life, we will use present values to compare veterans' benefits of different wars. In effect, we 
are asking what the value would be of a bond given to each veteran at the end of the war that would 
have produced income equal to the benefits the veteran later received. As soon as one begins to 
calculate present values, of course, various questions arise: what discount rate should be used, how 
money paid to widows and children should be counted, and so on. We address these questions by 
computing variants, for example by using alternative discount rates. As it turns out, the broad 
differences to which we draw attention do not depend on the way present values are calculated.   
 
2. What Explains the Level of Benefits? 
In many cases veterans' benefits were simply deferred pay. When soldiers volunteered or were 
drafted they were promised a reward after the war. The contract might have been explicit or implicit: 
Retirement benefits might have been part of the recruitment package; but even when there was no 
explicit promise soldiers might have assumed that they would be rewarded after the war simply 
because legislation rewarding veterans was passed after previous wars.    5
  Sometimes there is more to veterans' benefits, however, than deferred pay. We also reward 
veterans to express our gratitude for the risks they have taken and the hardships they have suffered. 
The analogy with gratuities paid for more mundane services, although it may be unpleasant to think 
about it in these terms, is apt. We often give a gratuity because it is part of the pay for the services 
rendered, but sometimes we give a larger gratuity to reward extraordinary service. Sometimes we 
use military language to describe a civilian gratuity: we reward someone generously because they 
“went beyond the call of duty.” In the nineteenth century civilian language was used, on occasion,  
to describe veterans' benefits: Veterans' benefits were referred to as the “veterans' gratuity.”  George 
Washington referred to the distinction between deferred pay and gratuities in a circular letter to the 
governors defending the pension awarded his officers.  The pension was part of their hire, "…it was 
the price of their blood, and of your independency; it is therefore more than a common debt, it is a 
debt of honor; it can never be considered as a pension or gratuity, nor be cancelled until it is fairly 
discharged."
3 
  The decision to reward veterans was always a contentious political decision that was 
influenced by a number of factors. We will discuss these factors in this section in general terms and 
then apply them to the cases that follow. Most of these forces can be grouped under six headings:  
 (1)  The previous history of veterans' benefits. Veterans' benefits are a good example of a 
path-dependent process. The amount veterans received after the last war produces a strong 
gravitational force. If veterans of the last war received $100 per month starting at age 62, a strong 
presumption is established that veterans of the next war should get same pension. If they receive less, 
they have a strong basis for claiming that they have been treated unfairly. If they receive more, they 
can be criticized for being greedy, and the way is opened for veterans of previous wars who can 
demand more benefits based on equity.   
                                                 
3 Quoted in Glasson (1918, 43).   6
  This does not mean that benefits inevitably ratchet upward. At times benefit systems have 
come under heavy criticism. Perhaps after the last war benefits were extended to individuals with 
dubious claims to service. Or perhaps benefits were extended through "pension marriages" – aged 
veterans marrying young women so the women and their children could receive a pension after the 
veterans died. If so, there may be a reaction in the form of stricter eligibility requirements when the 
next set of veterans ask for benefits. As with other path-dependent processes, the accidents of history 
may shape the course of events. The occupant of the White House might be important: A former 
military officer, for example, might be more sympathetic to veterans. 
 (2)  Secular changes in national wealth.  As the United States has grown richer it has been 
able to reward its veterans more generously. Indeed, for some purposes it makes more sense to 
measure benefits relative to national wealth when comparing benefits across wars. In other words, 
the right question might be whether veterans of one war received more or less relative to wealth in 
their era compared with veterans of another war. 
 (3)  The number of veterans. The number of veterans is an important determinant of their 
political influence. As usual, numbers cut two ways. A larger number of veterans means that 
veterans (and their families) have more votes to offer politicians who support higher benefits. On the 
other hand, a larger number of veterans means that taxes have to be raised in order to pay for higher 
benefits, or that the benefits provided other citizens have to be cut. Either decision involves heavy 
political costs. It may be possible to provide a small number of veterans with higher benefits without 
raising taxes to the point that the increase is visible to tax payers.  
 (4)  The effectiveness of individuals and organizations working on behalf of veterans. After 
every war veterans have joined new or existing veterans' organizations that have lobbied on their 
behalf. The effectiveness of those organizations and their leaders has played a role in determining   7
the level of benefits. At times lawyers, or other paid agents of veterans have carried out important 
lobbying efforts, hoping to profit if they win additional benefits for veterans.  
 (5)  Public attitudes towards the war. How much did the veterans actually suffer during the 
war? How much did they accomplish? How just was the war? Our first reaction is that the answers to 
these questions should not matter: all veterans should be well treated. But as we will show below, 
the answers to these questions did influence the level and timing of benefits.   
 (6)  The state of the federal treasury. If the treasury is running a surplus, and more surpluses 
are in the offing, the demands of veterans can be met easily; if the treasury is running a deficit, and 
more deficits are in the offing, veterans will find the road to higher pensions difficult. The crucial 
thing, of course, is how the public and the politicians view the state of the treasury. The same budget 
will look very different to politicians who hold a balanced budget sacrosanct than to politicians who 
believe a deficit is a good way of assuring full employment.  
  The state of the treasury will be more important when benefits are paid from general 
revenues. In the early part of the nineteenth century some naval benefits were paid from a fund 
derived from the sale of captured foreign merchant ships and their cargoes. This method of finance 
changes the role of the taxpayer. Naval pensions and the role of the Naval Prize Fund are discussed 
in detail in Clark, Craig, and Wilson (2003). Most nineteenth century veterans, however, were army 
veterans, so the state of the treasury was the key factor. In the antebellum period the federal 
government's and the states’s "land budgets" were often as important as fiscal budgets.
4 There were 
times when generous grants of land could be made to veterans even when cash grants seemed 
difficult; in other words times when governments were land rich and cash poor. 
  Veterans’ benefits, we will argue, can be characterized like consumer spending. Benefits to 
compensate veterans who were injured in the course of the war are analogous to necessities: The 
                                                 
4 Grubb (2005) stresses the importance of land to the "net asset" position of the United States.   8
government will pay without regard to the current state of the budget. Old-age pensions, however, 
were like luxuries: The government would “buy” them provided its income was high enough relative 
to its expenditures. 
  These six factors have often been cited in previous studies of veterans benefits in the 
nineteenth century such as Bodenger (1971), Oberly (1990), Skocpol (1992), Resch (1999), Teipe 
(2002), Clark, Craig, and Wilson (2003), and the classic with which all other studies of nineteenth-
century pensions begin, Glasson (1918). We cannot claim, therefore, that our analysis, including our 
emphasis the state of the federal treasury, is unprecedented. Indeed, any explanation of something as 
important as veterans' benefits that was based on an entirely new set of explanatory factors would be 
highly suspect. Rather, our claim is that we have sharpened the existing portrait of the political 
economy veterans' benefits and established more rigorously some of the empirical generalizations 
already in the literature by developing and exploring data on the number and value of cash pensions 
and land grants. We will begin by comparing cash pensions awarded to veterans of the antebellum 
wars. 
 
3. Service Pensions for Veterans of the Antebellum Wars 
Figure 1 compares the present discounted value of the cash benefits received by veterans for service 
in the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. In each case we deflated the annual 
amount spent on a pension by a cost of living index (Historical Statistics 2006, series Cc2), 
discounted the resulting series back to the end of the war at three percent or six percent,
 5 and 
divided by the number of soldiers and sailors who served in the war (Table 1). Evidently, the 
                                                 
5 Over the years 1798 to 1860 the yield on U.S. long-term bonds averaged (in years when it is available) 5.71 
percent; the yield on New England municipals averaged 5.11 (Historical Statistics 2006, series Cj1192, Cj1194). 
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veterans of the War of 1812 received substantially less than did the veterans of the Revolution or the 
Mexican War. The difference between the benefits when discounted at three percent and when 
discounted at six percent points to the important role of timing: The veterans of the War of 1812 do 
relatively better when a low rate of discount is used.  
  A natural if somewhat cynical conclusion that follows from Figure 1 is that it is the 
difference in the success of American arms that explains the difference in benefits. America won the 
Revolutionary War and the Mexican War – indeed America won great empires in these wars – but 
lost, or at least accomplished very little, in the War of 1812. This interpretation, we argue below in 
more detail, may have an element of truth to it, although another, perhaps more important factor, the 
state of the federal treasury, was also at work: Veterans of the Revolution benefited from periods of 
treasury surpluses, while veterans of the War of 1812 came due for their pension when the budget 
was in deficit.  
  In terms of nominal amounts, the idea that veterans of a given war should be given what 
veterans of the proceeding war were given worked to an unusual extent in the nineteenth century. 
The standard rate of $8 per month did not change from 1818 to 1903. Some variation in the real 
value of pensions was introduced, as shown in Figure 2, by movements in prices and wages. It is 
evident, however, that price movements were not a major source of the differences revealed by 
Figure 1. Thus, the main factor behind the differences in Figure 1 was the time that veterans had 
to wait for their service pensions.  
  One way to highlight the role of timing is to calculate the pensions of a hypothetical 
standardized veteran. Consider a private or noncommissioned officer, who (1) survived a war 
without a disability entitling him to a pension, who (2) was eligible for a service pension when it 
became available, who (3) lived for 70 years after the war, and who (4) left no dependents. Although   10
hypothetical, these calculations provide a picture of the relative size of the pensions; both in terms of 
what the legislators had in mind, and in terms of what the veterans ultimately received. When we do 
this we find that our hypothetical long-lived veteran of the Revolution would have received a service 
pension worth $64 in 1860$s, our hypothetical veteran of the War of 1812 would have received $27, 
and our hypothetical veteran of the Mexican War would have received $143. These figures are 
higher than the estimates in Figure 1 that reflect the actual experience of the veterans, but the 
ordering is similar. Evidently, the Veterans of the War of 1812 received less in large part because 
they had to wait so long for their service pensions. We therefore need to look at the history of how 
and when these benefit programs were established to explain why the veterans of the War of 1812 
did less well than the veterans of the other antebellum wars.  
  
4. Service Pensions: The Revolutionary War 
The Revolutionary War was no exception to the rule that debate over veterans' benefits starts 
with what was awarded to veterans of the last war. English and colonial practice was to pay 
compensation to all soldiers who were injured and unable to work, but to pay service pensions 
only to officers. Legislation promising compensation for Revolutionary soldiers was passed soon 
after the Revolution began. The rate for privates and noncommissioned officers was $5.00 per 
month.
6 Pensions for widows and orphans of officers were also well accepted. One of the first 
awards, in April 1777, was to the youngest son of General Mercer who died in the Battle of 
Princeton. All told, General Mercer’s youngest son would receive $3,876, perhaps $1.6 million 
                                                 
6 A crude estimate of daily wages of unskilled labor during the Revolution varies between $.40 and $.56. So $5.00 
represents what an unskilled laborer could earn in 9 to 13 days: a small sum to live on, but an important supplement 
for veterans who had other sources of income. Wages during the Revolution were estimated by using an index 
money wages for unskilled labor available during the Revolution (Historical Statistics 2006, series  Ba4218) to 
backdate daily wages for unskilled labor in Philadelphia (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ba4219), a series that first 
becomes available in 1785. 
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in today’s money (2004) using the wages of unskilled labor as an inflator (U.S. Senate 1877; 
Williamson 2004).  
  But the officers' demand for half-pay for life, although based on current British practice, 
proved highly controversial. At first Washington opposed the idea of half pay on the grounds that it 
would be too expensive; but when conditions in the army deteriorated in 1777-78, and officers began 
returning home, Washington changed his mind and supported half-pay for life. In May 1778 
Congress promised half pay, although only for seven years, for officers who served until the end of 
the war, and $80 mustering out pay (one year's pay) for common soldiers, about $33,000 in today's 
money (2004) using the wages of unskilled labor as an inflator (Williamson 2004). In October 1780 
Congress, under pressure from the officers and from Washington, increased the offer to officers to 
half pay for life for those who served until the end of the war. 
  The story, however, was not to end so happily for the officers. Early in March 1783 the 
officers with the American army at Newburgh, New York became increasingly anxious about 
whether arrears of pay and the commitment to half-pay for life would be fulfilled once a treaty of 
peace was signed. On March 10, 1783 an anonymous letter appeared urging the officers not to lay 
down their arms and disband until their demands for back pay and pensions were met: the famous 
"Newburgh Conspiracy." Washington met this challenge by calling a general meeting of the officers 
on March 15. At that meeting Washington addressed his men and assured them that Congress would 
fulfill its promises. The story goes that during the speech Washington began to read a letter from 
Congress and said "you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but 
almost blind in the service of my country."
7 Supposedly his officers, some of whom did not know 
                                                 
7Flexner (1984 [1974], 168-178) provides a clear and moving account of the conspiracy. Historians are not agreed 
on how far the plotters were really prepared to go.  In an interesting exchange in the William and Mary Quarterly, 
Richard H. Kohn (1970) argued that it was a full blown conspiracy; a position strongly disputed by Edward C. 
Skeen (1974).    12
that he wore glasses, were so overcome with emotion that they began to cry. On March 22, with the 
threat quashed, and the budget once more on the front burner, Congress passed the "Commutation 
Act," which promised former officers cash or interest bearing securities amounting at face value to 
full pay for five years in lieu of half-pay for life.
8 About 2,500 officers received securities under the 
Act (Bodenger 1971, 21). 
  The events in Newburgh made up the most extreme case of a conflict between the claims of 
the veterans and the state of the federal treasury. Indeed, Flexner (1984 [1974], 177) claims that the 
meeting on March 15 "was probably the most important single gathering ever held in the United 
States." But the conflict was to be repeated in some form after every war in the nineteenth century. 
  The fear of the officers that Congress would fail to pay them once their services were no 
longer needed proved well-founded. Under the Confederation the government failed to pay interest 
on the commutation bonds. Eventually, these debts were assumed by the federal government under 
Hamilton's plan for reorganizing the debt. Indeed, they were the largest part of the debt assumed by 
the federal government. In the meantime, however, many officers and enlisted men had sold their 
securities to investors at heavy discounts. E. James Ferguson (1954) studied what happened in 
Maryland, the state with the best-preserved records, and found that about 52 percent of the securities 
issued to Maryland's soldiers had been acquired by the State of Maryland because they could be used 
to satisfy state debts. Of the 48 percent that remained in private hands about 82 percent had been 
transferred to private investors at a price that might have been, according to Ferguson (1954, 41), 20 
to 40 cents on the dollar. The officers continually petitioned Congress for additional compensation. 
And in 1818 officers in "reduced circumstances" received a pension of $20 per month, about $4,200 
per month in today's money (2004) using the wages of unskilled labor as the inflator (Williamson 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8 The par value of the commutation bonds equaled half pay for 16 years discounted at 6 percent.   
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2004). This was, as we will explain below, a period of extraordinary federal budget surpluses. 
Finally, in 1828, the surviving officers were granted full pay for the remainder of their lives. 
  There was no precedent, as far as we are aware, in the American experience for a service 
pension for privates or noncommissioned officers. It was natural, however, in a new nation that took 
democracy seriously that privates and noncommissioned officers would feel they deserved a pension, 
and would be viewed as deserving by the public. In their case the pension received by the officers 
was the precedent. The enlisted men, moreover, could point to the same failures on the part of 
Congress to live up to its promises, as could the officers. Congress had paid in Continental dollars 
that had depreciated rapidly, and sometimes had failed to pay altogether. True, Congress had given 
the enlisted men interest-bearing securities for the arrears in pay and for the $80 bonus, but Congress 
had failed to pay interest on these securities, as it had on the securities given to the officers.  
  In the years following the War of 1812, moreover, the state of the federal treasury was 
promising for the passage of a service pension for veterans of the Revolution.
9  The United 
States ran large deficits during the War of 1812; in 1816 and 1817, however, the treasury ran 
large surpluses, as can be seen in Figure 3. The surplus was 56 percent (measured as a 
percentage of expenditures) in 1816, and 52 percent in 1817 (Historical Statistics 2006, series 
Ea584, Ea585). The surpluses were temporary, the result of a postwar surge in imports that 
produced increased tariff revenues. One result, nevertheless, was an important piece of veterans' 
legislation. The law of 1818, mentioned above in connection with the officers, also provided a 
pension of $8 per month for privates and noncommissioned officers who had served nine months 
during the Revolution and were now in "reduced circumstances."  As can be seen in Figure 3, 
spending on pensions ratcheted upward as a result. Spending on pensions under the law of 1818 
                                                 
9 The following two paragraphs are based on John Resch (1999). 
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significantly exceeded compensation for wounded veterans including those wounded in the War 
of 1812 and for the dependents of soldiers and sailors who died while in service (the lowest line 
in Figure 3).  
  The new law was soon in trouble. The War Department was overwhelmed with 
applications and it was clear that many veterans were misrepresenting their resources. The 
widely discussed case of Ebenezer Huntington, a wealthy former officer from Connecticut who 
had managed to get a pension, personified the corruption. The problem even reached into the 
War Department where bureaucrats enrolled veterans whose assets exceeded the Department's 
standards. The treasury surpluses, moreover, disappeared soon after the law of 1818 took effect: 
In 1820 the deficit was two percent of expenditures, and in 1821, eight percent of expenditures 
(Historical Statistics 2006, series Ea584, Ea585). Congress responded to the public's outrage 
over corruption in the pension system and the deterioration in the budget by striking all of the 
veterans from the rolls and requiring that they reapply. In the summer of 1820 Americans 
watched in fascination as veterans of the Revolution mustered prior to presenting their 
applications. Old soldiers shouldered their crutches as they had once shouldered their muskets. 
The effect of the re-enrollment amendment shows up clearly in Figure 3 as a sharp contraction in 
net expenditures in 1821.
10 
  The 1820 amendment, and its vigorous enforcement by Secretary of War John C. 
Calhoun and the head of the pension bureau James L. Edwards, put an end to the scandals and 
saved the program. Now public attention shifted from men who had been unfairly added to the 
rolls to men who had been unfairly excluded. There were many possible inequities. A veteran 
who had gone into debt to buy property on the expectation of a pension might now be denied a 
                                                 
10 Our estimates of net expenditure are the differences between warrants issued and repayments. Since repayments 
could be based on warrants issued in previous years, our estimate of zero net expenditure in fiscal 1821 is consistent 
with some veterans receiving payments from the government.   15
pension on the grounds that his gross assets (one of the criteria used by the War Department) 
were too high. A veteran who deeded his property to his children in exchange for long-term care, 
a common practice, would qualify for a pension; a veteran in similar circumstances who kept 
title to his assets would not. The budget, moreover, having recovered from the effects of the 
Panic of 1819, was now solidly in the black: the surplus was about 30 percent of expenditures in 
1822 and 1823 (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ea584, Ea585). In 1823, therefore, Congress 
allowed veterans to submit amended applications. Veterans were now free to restate their assets 
in a way that met War Department standards. The 1823 amendment does not seem to have left a 
strong imprint on the pension rolls (Table A1 column 4), but it does illustrate the willingness of 
Congress to address inequities provided the budget was favorable. 
  Pressure now began to build for a non-means-tested pension and a reduction in the required 
term of service. The legislation of 1828, mentioned above, that awarded officers who served until the 
end of the war full pay for life, made a similar award to privates and noncommissioned officers who 
had enlisted in the Continental Army and served until the end of the war. This law, however, 
pensioned few soldiers. 
  With this precedent on the books, however, it is easy to see why pressure then built to expand 
benefits further. Veterans who had served, but not until the end of the war, or who had served in 
state or local militias rather than the Continental Army, now had a basis for claiming a pension. In 
his first State of the Union Message in 1829 Andrew Jackson, a hero of the War of 1812 and the 
Indian Wars, advocated extending benefits to the militia who served in the Revolution, although only 
when a veteran "… is unable to maintain himself in comfort."
11 Legislation passed in the House, but 
stalled in the Senate. Among those opposed to increased benefits was Senator Robert Y. Hayne of 
                                                 
11 Andrew Jackson, State of the Union Message, December 8, 1929. The American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/, accessed June 12, 2007. 
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South Carolina. Hayne pointed out, among other things, that there was a connection between the 
protective tariff – the famous "Tariff of Abominations" had been passed in 1828 – and veterans' 
pensions. To increase the pension rolls was to delay the day when tariffs could be reduced (Glasson 
1918, 77-78). In 1832, however, despite opposition from men like Hayne, legislation was passed that 
provided full pay for life to all veterans without regard to their economic or physical status who had 
served for two years in the regular army, the navy, or (significantly) the militias. Those who had 
served for shorter periods received proportionately less.  
  As can be seen in Figure 4, the Act of 1832 was passed during a run of years when the 
federal budget was in surplus, and following two years of record surpluses. Indeed, the surplus had 
been larger, measured as a percentage of expenditures, in only two proceeding years (Historical 
Statistics 2006, series Ea584, Ea585). Spending on Revolutionary pensions increased as a result of 
the legislation. The amounts of additional spending, however, were relatively small, although the 
effect on the surplus was not negligible. Fifty years had passed since the end of the war, and the 
number of eligible veterans had been greatly reduced. Nevertheless, an important precedent had been 
established. From this time onward veterans could claim that equity with veterans of the Revolution 
required that they be given a pension based on service alone when they reached an advanced age. 
Shortly after passing this bill, which increased the need for long-term taxes, Jackson signed the tariff 
legislation that led to the Nullification Crisis.  
  The Revolutionary War also set the precedent for pensioning widows. During the war the 
widows of soldiers or sailors killed in battle were pensioned, a colonial tradition. But under the Act 
of July 4, 1836 widows who were married before 1794 to revolutionary officers, soldiers, seamen, 
and marines were made eligible for a pension. Thus, to put it somewhat differently, women who had 
married a non-commissioned officer or soldier who had survived the war became eligible for a   17
pension. The effect of the pensioning of widows, orphans, and other dependents can be seen in 
Figure 4 as the opening of the gap after 1836 between total expenditures and Act of 1832 
expenditures.  This law was a remarkable break with colonial tradition. At the peak over 9,000 
widows and other dependents would be on the rolls (Table A1 column 5). Pensioning the widows of 
ordinary soldiers and seamen who had survived the war set a dominant precedent: The widows of 
veterans of all future wars would be pensioned. 
  An attempt was made at about this time to pension the veterans of various engagements with 
Native Americans that had taken place in the years immediately following the Revolution (U.S. 
House 1836). This effort ran into opposition based on the political morality of the war. It was 
contended that the Indian Wars were different from the Revolution – they were carried on by private 
individuals with the goal of private gain. The veterans of the Indian Wars, as they were known, 
would have to wait for their pensions. 
  Legislation in March 1837 directed the Navy Pension Fund to pay the widows and orphans 
who were now eligible for a pension from the time of the veteran's death. This legislation, according 
to Clark, Craig, and Wilson, although passed when the Navy Pension Fund appeared to be in good 
financial shape, doomed it. In a few years the fund was gone (2003, 58-60). Clark, Craig, and 
Wilson are probably right that the increase in benefits for veterans was partly due to the attempt to 
build up the navy because of the tensions with Britain over the U.S. boundary with Canada. And 
Theda Skocpol is probably right that the expansion of the franchise made it more important 
politically to pension the widows of ordinary soldiers and sailors (1993, 92). However, the 
pensioning of the widows and orphans is also consistent with a simple fiscal theory of the pensions: 
Fiscal 1836 saw the last and largest in a series of surpluses. The federal budget would go into deficit 
after the Panic of 1837.    18
  Time soon took its toll. By 1848 little more than 3,000 widows remained on the rolls (Table 
A1, column 5). An act of July 29, 1848 pensioned widows who were married before January 1800. 
In other words it pensioned women who had married veterans between 1794 (the cutoff under the 
law of 1836) and 1800. This amendment, a subsequent amendments along the same lines, produced 
small increases in the number of widows on the rolls.  
  As we have seen, Revolutionary War Veterans had to wait 35 years (1783 to 1818) for a 
means-tested service pension, and 45 years (1783 to 1828) for a non-means-tested service pension. 
Given that the precedent of an old-age pension had been established and that the United States had 
grown richer one might have expected that the veterans of the War of 1812 would have received 
their old-age pension in fewer years. In 1845, 30 years after the end of the War of 1812, for example, 
real per capita income was 30 percent higher than it was in 1818 when the Revolutionary War 
Pension was created (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ca11). However, this was not to be. Veterans 
of the War of 1812 would have to wait longer for their service pensions even though the country had 
grown richer.  
  Before exploring the cash pensions received by the veterans of the War of 1812 and 
subsequent wars, however, we need to look at the land grants made to veterans of the Revolution and 
subsequent wars. As Farley Grubb (2005) has recently argued, it is a mistake to look solely at cash 
expenditures, because land was an important part of the government's "net asset position." It is 
possible that including land grants would alter our conclusion that the veterans of the War of 1812 
did badly compared with the veterans of other nineteenth-century wars. The land grant story, 
however, reinforces the cash pension story.   19
 
  
5. Land Grants 
Land grants for military service were a long-standing colonial tradition.
12  Land was awarded, for 
example, to soldiers who had participated in the Pequot War in 1637. Maryland awarded land in 
1645 for help in suppressing the rebellion led by the pirate Richard Ingle. Land was also awarded to 
the veterans of King Philip's War in 1675-76. The French and Indian War of 1754-1763 provided the 
immediate precedent for the Revolutionary land grants. The war began in the west with the 
campaigns in which George Washington took part. A proclamation by Governor Dinwiddie of 
Virginia issued in 1754 authorized land grants to soldiers who participated.  At the conclusion of the 
War, George III's Royal Proclamation of 1763 rewarded veterans with 50 to 5,000 acres depending 
on their rank.
13 
  The reliance of colonial authorities on land grants is easily understood. As Paul Wallace 
Gates put it in his magisterial History of Public Land Law Development, America in that era was 
“long on land and short on money” (Gates 1968, 249). It was natural, therefore, that America would 
reward veterans of the Revolution with land grants. The earliest offer came in 1776, but ironically it 
was an offer of 50 acres to British soldiers who deserted (Gates 1968, 251). To make sure that the 
offer reached the Hessians, it was printed in German on the backs of tobacco wrappers (Hibbard 
1965 [1924], 118).   
                                                 
12 The examples in this paragraph are drawn from the "Introduction" to Lloyd DeWitt Bockstruck's forthcoming 
volume on bounty and donation land grants in British North America. We thank Dr. Bockstruck for making the 
Introduction available to us prior to publication. 
 
13 The Proclamation can be read at http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/proc63.htm. (Accessed Friday, May 
25, 2007).   20
  Both the Continental Congress and the states made grants. The grants made by the 
Continental Congress went to veterans of the Continental Army; the grants made by the states went 
to veterans of their militias and as supplemental grants to their citizens who served in the Continental 
Army.  The southern states were especially generous. Virginia, the most populist state and the one 
with the most western land, steadily increased its bounties during the course of the war as it became 
harder and harder to enlist men. Toward the end of the war ordinary soldiers and sailors were 
promised 300 acres and a slave to work the land. North Carolina made the largest grants. Under a 
law of 1780 the North Carolina scale started with 640 acres for privates and 1000 acres for 
noncommissioned officers.  
  The rewards to officers, in many cases, were far more generous than the rewards for enlisted 
men. The Continental Congress gave brigadier generals 850 acres and major generals 1,100 acres. 
North Carolina added 12,000 for both brigadier and major generals, but rewarded Major General 
Nathaniel Greene, the hero of the Revolution in the South, with a “little dukedom,” as one Tennessee 
legislator put it, of 25,000 acres (Gates 1968, 252-53). Virginia added an additional 10,000 acres for 
brigadier generals and 15,000 for major generals. Virginia granted Major General Charles Lee, 
16,875 acres, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, 23,328 acres, and Major General Horatio Gates, 31, 
000 acres (Bockstruck 1996, 196, 308, 376).
14 Washington undoubtedly could have had an enormous 
amount of land. He refused, however, to accept any land for his service during the Revolution, even 
though his personal economy depended on the extensive lands awarded to him for his service in the 
French and Indian War (Flexner 1984 [1974], 53-54, 194). The Northern states made smaller 
distinctions among ranks. Whereas Virginia gave privates 300 acres and major generals 15,000, a 
ratio of 50 to one; New York gave privates 500 acres and major generals 5,500, a ratio of 11 to one 
                                                 
14 The area of the island of Manhattan is about 13,000 acres; the borough, which includes some water and adjacent 
islands, is about 22,000 acres. 
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(Gates 1968, 252). The states with large claims on western lands were, of course, in a position to 
reward their veterans generously. The expectation that those claims might have to be surrendered to 
the central government simply added another incentive to reward their own citizens generously. 
  Although the veterans of the Revolution were promised a great deal of land, its monetary 
value is difficult to estimate, and may not have been very great. Some preliminary efforts to 
distribute federal land were made in the mid-1780s, but it was not until 1796 that a military track 
in Ohio was made available where small holders could exercise their warrants (Gates 1968, 259). 
In the meantime most veterans had sold their warrants to speculators. The largest of the 
speculators in federal warrants was the New Jersey politician Jonathan Dayton who acquired 
90,936 acres by buying warrants (Gates 1968, 260). The story of how land was distributed by the 
states varied from state to state, but the tendency for veterans to experience long delays and to 
sell their warrants to speculators and developers was the norm. 
  The policy of rewarding soldiers with land grants continued after the Revolution. Texas, 
as might be expected based on its vast acreages, made generous grants. The Texas constitution of 
1836 promised families who were loyal to the state "a League and Labor" of land, 4606 acres; 
single men over the age of 17 were promised a third of a league, 1,476 acres. An act of 
December 21, 1837, awarded 640 acres to veterans who had participated in various engagements 
during the Texas War of Independence such as the Goliad campaigns of 1835 and 1836, and the 
battle of the Alamo.
15 
   Initially, veterans of the War of 1812 who served in the regular army received bounties of 
160 acres; an amount that was raised to 320 acres toward the end of the war (Hickey 1989, 243-44). 
About 29,000 of the 60,000 regulars took them up. There were, however, several problems with the 
                                                 
15 See Land Grants in The Handbook of Texas Online; 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/LL/mpl1.html, accessed 6/28/2007.   22
grants from the point of view of the veterans. First, the grants were located in a few restricted 
western areas, in part because it was hoped that the veterans would be a buffer against Native 
Americans. This was also true of the Revolutionary warrants, but many of the Revolutionary grants 
were in highly productive farmland, such as those in South Central Ohio. One area in Michigan 
reserved for veterans of the War of 1812 was replaced when it was found to be too swampy, 
although some of the other areas reserved for the veterans of 1812 did contain good farmland. The 
warrants, moreover, could not be sold to a broker, at least not without some legal maneuvering; they 
were not "assignable" in the language of the time. Although veterans and their agents found various 
ways around this limitation, it undoubtedly raised the cost of selling the warrants. An even more 
important factor, however, was simply that the veterans who had served in state militias were not 
entitled to grants. State governments rewarded many veterans who had served in militias during the 
Revolution. However, this was no longer possible because the states had ceded their western lands to 
the federal government. 
  It was undoubtedly the officers of the War of 1812 who felt most aggrieved. As we noted, the 
officers of the Revolutionary War received handsome land grants. In 1811, however, when bounties 
were first offered to soldiers for the War of 1812, there was nothing extra for the officers. Further 
attempts to reward the officers were made during the war and in 1817, but nothing came of them 
(Gates 1968, 262 ftn. 37). As Gates suggests, Congress was probably reacting to the perception that 
great estates had arisen as a result of the huge grants made at the close of the Revolution. Congress 
also may have been reacting to the related perception that the land grants had produced excessive 
speculation in western lands, always a political liability.  
  There was also the perception that the fighting was not very intense. In a memorial to 
Congress in 1831 a group of War of 1812 officers pointed out the Revolutionary War precedents and   23
asked for similar treatment. They also pointed out that U.S. citizens living in Canada in 1812 and 
who had volunteered to serve with the American forces had received land bounties, and in that case 
the officers had been given larger bounties than the enlisted men – up to 960 acres for a colonel. The 
officers conceded that they may not have suffered as much as the officers of the Revolutionary 
armies, but they insisted that they had accomplished as much. "The [officers in the War of 1812] … 
exhibited the same valor and love of liberty [as the officers in the Revolution], and, although they 
may not as a body have suffered as much, yet their zeal was not less, nor their exertions less 
meritorious or successful" (U.S. House 1831). One wonders, of course, whether Congress found the 
last part of their claim persuasive. Unlike their brethren in the Revolution and the Mexican War, the 
veterans of the War of 1812 had conquered little land for the United States.  
  No legislation responding to these complaints was forthcoming, however, until the land 
grants given to the veterans of the Mexican-American war (1847-48) ignited a campaign to secure 
additional land for the veterans of 1812. The "Ten Regiments Act" of 1847 designed to fill the ranks 
for the Mexican War provided more valuable benefits than had the 1812 grants: a warrant for 160 
acres of land anywhere in the public domain for every regular and volunteer who joined the war 
against Mexico and served for 12 months or until the end of the war. The warrants, moreover, could 
be sold to a broker for cash if the veteran did not want to settle the land; they were assignable. 
According to Oberly "After the act's passage and the president's signature, army recruiters busily 
signed up men on the basis of the new bounty (1990, 11)." 
  The passage of the Ten Regiments Act reminded the surviving veterans of the War of 1812 
of their old grievances. They demanded parity with the veterans of the Mexican War, and Congress 
obliged soon after the war with Mexico ended. This is not surprising. The veterans of 1812 had a 
strong claim based on equity, and granting it was easy given the immense booty, including   24
California, taken from Mexico. The Bounty Land Act of 1850 provided veterans of the War of 1812, 
of various Indian Wars, and of various other fights with up to 160 acres depending on length of 
service. The warrants, however, could not be sold to brokers, a nod to the opponents of 
"speculators." It was implausible, however, that the veterans of the War of 1812, many now in their 
sixties, would move West to take up farming or even that they would go through the laborious 
process of taking possession of and selling their land. The veterans wanted assignable bounties. 
  The brokers were also an important voice for liberalization of the Bounty Land Act because 
they were running out of warrants issued under the Ten Regiments Act. Congress responded with 
what was popularly known as the Assignment Bill of 1852, which allowed veterans of the War of 
1812 to sell their land warrants through brokers. The 1850 and 1852 Acts required one month of 
service for 40 acres and nine months for the full 160 acres. 
  The fight to secure bounties for the veterans of the War of 1812 was led by the United 
Brethren of the War of 1812. It was headed by Joel B. Sutherland, a physician in the War of 1812, a 
successful politician in the postwar era, and as it proved, a skillful champion of the veterans. In 1855 
the veterans held a march on the White House holding aloft a banner bearing the slogan under which 
they had gone to war in 1812: "Free Trade and Sailor's Rights." President Pierce met with a 
delegation, but did not commit himself to their demands (Oberly 1990, 35-36). Further pressure, 
however, produced the Old Soldiers Act of 1855, which gave 160 acres to any soldier, whether in the 
regular army or the militia, who had served at least two weeks in the War of 1812. This was the high 
point for the United Brethren, which never held another national convention.  
    We have made some preliminary estimates, shown in Figure 5, of the amount of land given 
to the veterans of the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. These estimates are 
subject to a wide margin of error. Nevertheless, we believe that the impression created by the chart is   25
probably broadly correct. The details of how we made the estimates are in the appendix. The bar for 
the War of 1812 is divided into two parts. The lower part shows the amount awarded during the war. 
The upper part shows the amount awarded to the veterans of the War of 1812 after the Mexican War. 
The veterans of the War of 1812, evidently, received less initially, but caught up many years later. 
Without the latter grants the veterans of the War of 1812 would have done less well in terms of total 
land received, than the veterans of the Revolution.
16  
    We have also made some back-of-the envelope estimates of the real value to the veterans of 
the land grants. These estimates are subject to larger margins of error than the estimates of the total 
amount of land received because we lack data on exactly when veterans disposed of their land, how 
much they were paid for it, and what they were charged in transaction costs. Nevertheless, we made 
some estimates by assuming various schedules according to which veterans disposed of their land, 
and by using some available information on prices. The details of our calculation are in the appendix. 
These estimates show that on average the veterans of the Revolution received the equivalent $28 in 
1860 dollars in land warrants, veterans of the War of 1812 received $14, and veterans of the 
Mexican War received $137.  These estimates again suggest that the veterans of the War of 1812 did 
less well than either the veterans of the Revolution or the Mexican War.  
 
6. Service Pensions: The War of 1812 and the Mexican War 
  Sutherland, after his success with the land grants, began to lobby for a non-means-tested cash 
pension. He did not live, however,  to see it finally awarded in 1871, 56 years after the end of the 
                                                 
16 Veterans of subsequent wars also received help in buying land, but it appears that the Mexican War was the last in 
which land grants were a prominent component of benefits. Under the Homestead Act (1862) land could be acquired 
by paying $1.25 per acre or by farming the land for 5 years. Veterans could substitute military service for residence 
down to one year. Veterans of the Civil War also received the right to buy supplemental amounts of land. Many 
veterans probably made use of their military service in this way. However, the lack of transferability of the benefit 
limited its value to most soldiers.   26
war. By this time the ranks of the veterans had been greatly thinned, and hence the potential cost of 
the program was relatively low. Nevertheless, there was some strong opposition to a non-means-
tested pension based on the budget. Senator John Sherman, the Chair of the Committee on Finance, 
warned that a bill that pensioned all veterans of the War of 1812 would be too expensive; he wanted 
it restricted to indigent veterans. Sherman mentioned the precedent set by the law of 1832 but 
dismissed it on the grounds that the veterans of the Revolution had been paid initially with worthless 
paper.
17 Sherman complained, moreover, that the Revolutionary War pension had produced pension 
marriages, and wanted the War of 1812 pensions limited to widows who had been married to 
soldiers at the time of the war. To add all of the widows would add $5 million to annual 
expenditures.
18 When the law was finally enacted a pension was granted to all soldiers and sailors 
who had served 60 days – with no requirement that the veterans be in reduced circumstances – but it 
did limit benefits to widows who had been married to a veteran before the treaty of peace was signed 
and who had not remarried.  
  In 1878 the service pension for the War of 1812 was liberalized: only two weeks of service in 
the war were required. This change produced a small increase of about 1,200 in the number of 
survivors on the rolls (Table A1 continued, column 6). There was at the time, we should no longer 
be surprised, a surplus in the federal budget. Indeed, the federal budget had been in surplus in every 
year after the Civil War. This was consistent with the policy of deflating prices and returning to the 
gold standard at the prewar par. Running a surplus was a way of retiring the greenbacks and the 
federal debt. By the late 1870s the dollar was close to the prewar par, and return to the gold standard 
                                                 
17 There was considerable inflation during the War of 1812, but it was of a lower order of magnitude than the 
Revolutionary War inflation. The cost of living seems to have risen about 30 percent between 1812 and 1814, before 
subsiding to its prewar level in 1815-1817 (Historical Statistics 2006, series Cc2). 
 
18 "Forty-First Congress; Third Session," New York Times, Feb 4, 1871, p. 2. Federal expenditures in 1871 were 
$292 million (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ea585). 
. 
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was in sight. The monetary case for maintaining a surplus was less compelling, and therefore the 
case for spending more on the veterans was more attractive. 
  Why did the veterans of the War of 1812 and their heirs do less well than did the veterans of 
the Revolution? One factor, clearly, was the state of the treasury when the veterans of the War of 
1812 came due for their pensions. The veterans of the Revolution in "reduced circumstances” won 
lifetime pensions, as we noted above, 35 years after the end of the Revolution, and a non-means-
tested 10 years after that. With the same lags, the veterans of the War of 1812 would have been 
“due” for their means-tested pension in 1850 and due for their non-means-tested pension in 1860. 
The timing was unfortunate. In 1850 the veterans of the War of 1812 were in the midst of their fight 
for land bounties on a par with the veterans of the Mexican War. Indeed, the land bounties that they 
won, since they were easily convertible into cash, were a substitute for a cash pension. The amounts 
they actually received from the land grants were small compared with a cash pension at the 
Revolutionary rate. However, this might not have been obvious at the time: The rapid distribution of 
the public lands soon depressed the value of federal lands. The second date, 1860, falls just before 
the Civil War. Congress did not put all other projects aside simply because the nation was at war. 
Nevertheless, pensioning the veterans of the War of 1812 during the Civil War probably appeared 
injudicious in light of the rapid increase in the number of wounded veterans, widows and orphans on 
the pension rolls and the inflation and large deficits that marked the Civil War years. The number of 
pensions compensating for death and disability rose from 7,991 in 1860 to 154,477 in 1867 (Table 
A1 columns 2, 3); the deficit rose from $7 million in 1860 to close to a billion in 1865 (Historical 
Statistics 2006, series Ea586); and the price level doubled.  So part of the explanation for why the 
veterans of the War of 1812 received less than the veterans of the Revolution was simply bad timing:   28
Their pension obligations fell due when the federal treasury was stretched to the limit by the Civil 
War. 
  There may have been something more at work: the perception that American arms had done 
badly in the War of 1812. Perhaps, as mentioned in our discussion of the land grants, this group of 
veterans did not deserve as large a "gratuity" as the veterans of more successful wars.  It is hard to 
prove that the lack of success of American arms contributed to the delay in the awarding of the 
service pension. Few politicians would have admitted to this concern even if it had consciously or 
unconsciously influenced their thinking. However, it was from the start one of the most controversial 
wars in American history. The Federalists, the dominant party in New England, and with sizable 
groups of supporters in the South and West, opposed the war at every turn. Donald Hickey writes 
that in Congress the Federalists "unanimously opposed the declaration of war in June of 1812, and 
thereafter they voted against almost every proposal to raise men or money, to foster privateering, or 
to restrict trade with the enemy" (Hickey 1989, 255). To be sure, once the war was over, many 
Americans adopted the view that the war had been a great moral victory, even if the treaty had 
restored the status quo antebellum. The Federalists party disappeared as a result of its opposition to 
the war. Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison parlayed wartime victories into the 
Presidency. Nevertheless, it is possible that some remaining bitterness may have influenced the 
treatment of the veterans. 
  One piece of suggestive evidence is that the successful fight for land bounties in the 1850s 
was accompanied by an effort to burnish the image of the war. In 1847, just as the Mexican War 
began, Congressman Charles J. Ingersoll, who proved to be a strong ally of the veterans, published a 
two-volume revisionist history of the War of 1812. The Ingersoll volumes, soon followed by others 
along the same lines, argued that the army and navy had fought praiseworthy campaigns and   29
accomplished a great deal for the country (Oberly 1990, 30). In the end we probably will never know 
for certain that the controversial nature of the war and its ambiguous conclusion slowed the 
awarding of service pensions to the veterans of the War of 1812. But we cannot rule out the 
conclusion reached by the U.S. President’s Commission on Veterans’ Benefits (1956, 66) that one 
factor was that “There was little land fighting during the war, not many men were engaged in any 
one battle, and it was felt that the army did not accomplish much.”  
  The veterans of the Mexican War turned to the National Association of Mexican War 
Veterans to lobby for their pensions.
19 Its founder and leader was Alexander Kenaday, an eccentric 
and sometimes radical populist labor leader from California. The principal demand was for the same 
pension, $8.00 per month, that veterans of the Revolution and the War of 1812 had gotten. After 
continual lobbying, this pension was granted in 1887 for veterans aged 62 or more. From a fiscal 
point of view it was a favorable period for awarding a pension. The budget had been in surplus for 
several years; in 1886 the surplus was close to 30 percent of revenues. Thus, veterans of the Mexican 
War had to wait a shorter period (39 years) for their pension than did the veterans of the War of 1812 
(56 years). The wait for veterans of the Mexican War, however, was comparable to that experienced 
by the veterans of the Revolution: 35 years for a means-tested pension and 45 years for a non-
means-tested pension.  
  The awarding of the pension created a period of confusion for Kenaday, who was also the 
editor of the organization’s newspaper and, not incidentally, a prominent pension agent. He soon 
turned, however, to the next logical step: an increase in the pension. An increase to $12 per 
month was finally achieved in 1903. The pensioners got their raise, it should not surprise us, 
during a period of surplus. From 1894 through 1899 the budget was always in a deficit averaging 
                                                 
19 The next two paragraphs are based on Davies (1948).   30
-10.25 percent per year; from 1900 through 1903 the budget was in a surplus averaging +10.74 
percent per year (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ea584, Ea585). 
  Thus it appears that the major determinants of the old-age pension for the veterans of the 
Mexican War were what the veterans of earlier wars had received and the state of the federal budget. 
Public attitudes toward the war, however, did play a role in the timing. The Mexican War, although 
highly successful from a military point of view and highly profitable in terms of the wealth added to 
the United States, had aroused opposition from the start. Many Northerners saw it as an imperialist 
war undertaken by a southern president (James K. Polk) designed to add new slave territories to the 
United States. Ulysses Grant in a famous passage from his Memoirs recalled his opposition to the 
annexation of Texas and to the Mexican War which he regarded as "one of the most unjust ever 
waged by a stronger against a weaker nation" (Grant 1885, vol. 1, 53). Many of the soldiers who had 
taken part, moreover, were southerners who then fought for the Confederacy during the Civil War. 
Robert E. Lee was the most prominent example. According to Wallace E. Davies (1948, 226-228), 
early efforts to secure a pension for the Mexican War veterans failed during Republican 
administrations “because of apprehensions that such a measure might benefit many ex-
Confederates.” It was not until 1887 when the South-friendly Democrats were in power that the 
Mexican War veterans secured their service pension, and even then some ex-Confederates were 
disqualified.  
 
7. Service Pensions: The Civil War
20 
                                                 
20 We discuss only the pensions for Union veterans. Confederate veterans did not receive federal pensions. The 
Confederates, however, did receive pensions from southern states. These are described in Ratchford and Heise 
(1938). Short (2001) explores the (small) effect of these pensions on the retirement behavior of Confederate veterans. 
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The Civil War pension proved highly contentious. The reason was not that the individual pension 
was significantly larger than the earlier pensions. Controversy on that issue, as we have seen, was 
minimized by keeping the nominal pension constant. Economists looking for sticky nominal prices 
would have to look hard to find a better example. As can be seen in Figure 2, the post-Civil War 
deflation raised the purchasing power of the standard $8 per month pension, measured with the 
consumer price index, until at the end of the century it was on a par with the level in the late 
antebellum period.  
  In terms of wage units the standard pension, as shown by the lower line in Figure 2, was 
worth less in the postbellum era. In 1818, to put it somewhat differently, the standard annual pension 
could hire a farm laborer for 10 months; but by 1899 it could hire a farm laborer for only 7 months.
21  
Deflating the pension by the wage of unskilled labor is relevant to the actual pattern of consumption 
of many veterans. As the veteran aged he spent more of his income, in many cases, on services such 
as nursing care and less on goods. The Civil War pension system was often criticized because it led 
to corrupt "pension marriages." An elderly veteran would marry a young woman simply so that she 
would be eligible for a pension. One defense offered for the pension marriages was that they were 
really part of an exchange that benefited the veteran. The veteran received nursing care from a young 
woman for which the veteran was unable to pay out of his current income (because it was fixed in 
nominal terms and wages had risen), and in return the young woman entered into a pension marriage 
and received the pension after the veteran died.  
  Rather than the amount per veteran, the real sources of contention were the large number of 
veterans who received pensions, which meant that transfers to veterans materially affected taxes, and 
the disparity between the North and the South. As shown in Table 1 Union forces amounted to 6.84 
                                                 
21 The monthly earnings with board for farm laborers is from (Historical Statistics 2006, series Bc 4234-4243). 
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percent of the 1861 population. This percentage meant that the cost of the pensions was visible to the 
average taxpayer. The federal government, moreover, was financed to a substantial extent by tariffs. 
Southerners, therefore, saw themselves as twice abused.
22  First they paid high tariffs on imported 
goods, a tariff that protected northern industries from competition, but made it harder for southerners 
to export cotton and other cash crops. Then the proceeds of the tariff were distributed to union 
veterans and their families. In 1895, for example, tariffs accounted for 47 percent of total revenues; 
and pensions (mainly Civil War pensions) accounted for 40 percent of total federal expenditures 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series Y353, Y352, Y457, and Y463). 
  The legislation providing pensions for the Civil War veterans evolved along much the same 
lines as the legislation providing pensions of the veterans of earlier wars. A general law of 1862 
provided a pension at the rate of $8 to $30 per month (depending on rank) for totally disabled 
soldiers, or to the widows, orphans, or mothers of soldiers killed in battle. Subsequent legislation 
refined the table of benefits, creating specific benefits for a long list of disabilities.  
  Two pieces of legislation were crucial to the postwar expansion of the Civil War pension: the 
Arrears Act of 1879, and the Dependent Pensions Act of 1890. The Arrears Act became law in 
January 1879. Many soldiers had been placed on the rolls and started receiving benefits from dates 
well after the end of the war. There was, as many veterans and their advocates pointed out, a 
potential inequity here. A soldier who had shown great courage in battle might be receiving less than 
another soldier with an inferior military record simply because the first soldier had been slow to 
apply for a pension out of pride or lack of understanding. The Arrears Act would make good this 
inequity by paying any soldier who had qualified for a pension an additional amount to cover what 
they were due from the time of their discharge to the beginning of their pension. The Arrears Act, 
                                                 
22 Only Union veterans, with one exception, received federal pensions. The exception was the last surviving 
Confederate veteran who was pardoned and given a lifetime Federal pension – at age 105. 
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moreover, applied not only to those currently on the rolls but also to those who would be added in 
the future. 
  There was some uncertainty about the cost of the Arrears Act, and the plausibility of a 
relatively low estimate may have aided passage of the act. At a cabinet meeting at which the bill, 
having already passed both houses, was discussed, the Secretary of the Treasury, John Sherman, 
offered a figure of $150 million, while Carl Schurz, the Secretary of the Interior, offered a figure of 
$50 million based on an estimate by the Pension Office. President Hayes expressed some concern 
about the cost of the additional pensions, but signed the bill.
23 The cost of the Arrears Act eventually 
reached $200 million (U.S. President’s Commission 1956, 81). 
  Skocpol (1993, 98-99) has argued that the Arrears Act was not as closely associated with a 
bulging surplus in the federal treasury as was the law of 1890 (discussed below). Nevertheless, some 
account should be taken of the budget. The budget was in surplus, had been for a number of years. 
The surplus, moreover, was needed no longer to deflate the price level because the United States had 
returned to gold at the prewar par. Although we shouldn't make too much of the coincidence in 
timing, the return to the gold standard was accomplished on January 1, 1879 and the Arrears Act was 
passed by Congress on January 25. 
  The Dependent Pensions Act of 1890 clearly owed its existence to large budget surpluses. 
The law pensioned all veterans who had been honorably discharged and who now suffered from a 
disability that prevented them from performing manual labor.
24 There was no requirement, as there 
had been under previous laws, that the disability be the result of wounds suffered during the war. 
The law was not technically a service pension. It would not be until 1907 that a pure service pension 
                                                 
23 New York Times, "Yesterday's Cabinet Session," January 22, 1879, p. 1 
 
24 The infirmity could not be the result of the veteran's “own vicious habits.” 
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became law. The Pension Office, however, was instructed to grant a pension to all veterans who 
were 65 or older unless they were unusually vigorous, so in effect the law of 1890 was close to a 
service pension. The notion that the law of 1890 amounted to a service pension has been widely 
accepted (Costa 1995, 300-301). Figure 6 shows that the spending that resulted from this law (and 
from previous liberalizations) was sufficient to erase the surpluses that had persisted in the second 
half of the 1880s.  
  The close connection between the bulging surpluses in the federal treasury, which were 
produced by the tariff, and the liberalization of the pension in the early 1890s was no secret. 
Republican politicians made their support for generous pensions and high tariffs clear. As the 
Republican Party platform put it in 1888: 
The legislation of Congress should conform to the pledges made by a loyal people and be so 
enlarged and extended as to provide against the possibility that any man who honorably wore 
the Federal uniform shall become the inmate of an almshouse, or dependent upon private 
charity. In the presence of an overflowing treasury it would be a public scandal to do less for 
those whose valorous service preserved the government. 
 
The next, and last, plank in the platform invited “…all workingmen, whose prosperity is seriously 
threatened by the free-trade policy of the present Administration,” 
 to vote for the Republican 
candidate.
25 
  After the election President Harrison followed through on Republican promises. His first 
appointment to head the Pension Bureau was James Tanner a legless Union veteran who soon got 
into trouble. In one of his bombastic speeches, Tanner promised that as Pension Commissioner he 
would raise the pensions of veterans receiving only a pittance – often less than a dollar a week for 
small disabilities – even if his decisions raised from some lips the prayer: “God help the surplus” 
                                                 
25 Republican Platform 1888, American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php. The 
Democratic platform noted that the Cleveland Administration had paid out more in pensions than any previous 
administration, but made it clear that the Democrats intended to cut the tariff and other Civil War taxes. 
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(McMurry 1926, 345-347). Green B. Raum, a staunch but more discreet friend of the veteran, soon 
replaced Tanner. 
  The erosion of the surplus may have affected the next major piece of legislation. When 
legislation was passed in 1892 to provide pensions for veterans of the Indian Wars the youngest 
veterans who became eligible were veterans of the Seminole wars between 1832 and 1842. In other 
words, the minimum time that veterans of the Indian Wars had to wait was 50 years (1842 – 1892): 
Veterans of later engagements with Native Americans were not yet old enough for a pension.  
  The association between budget surpluses and veterans' pensions that we have identified for 
the 19
th century is less surprising than it would be in the twentieth century because surpluses were 
common. Indeed, between 1800 and 1899 the federal budget was in surplus in 69 out of 100 years, 
and in most of those years the surplus was fairly large. Nevertheless, one can show that there was a 
strong association between surpluses and pension legislation. Perhaps the simplest calculation that 
illustrates the association between budgets and pension legislation is the following. If the chance of a 
surplus was .69 the probability that all nine major pieces of pension legislation that we have 
identified (Table 2) would have fallen by chance in surplus years was only about 3.5 percent (.69
9). 
If we confine our attention to periods in which there was a run of years with surpluses an even 
clearer association between surpluses and pension laws emerges. The probability that by chance all 9 
pieces of legislation would have fallen into a year in which the budget was in surplus and had been 
in surplus in the two previous years was only .20 percent (.50
9). 
  A more formal method of making the same point is to estimate a regression in which the 
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value one in years when legislation expanding 
benefits for veterans was passed and the independent variables are current and lagged values of the 
surplus in the federal budget measured as a percentage of revenues. We ran several regressions of   36
this sort. We started with both the surplus and the first lagged value of the surplus. We dropped the 
former because it was not significant, although it was signed correctly. The result was the following. 
 
Legislation = -2.21 + .038*Surplus(-1)       (McFadden R
2 = .20) 
                                   (2.36) 
 
This was a probit regression. The number in parentheses is the z-statistic, which indicates that 
Surplus(-1) was significant at the .02 level. Adding additional lags of the surplus did not yield 
significant variables or improve the fit. The results were similar when logit or extreme value 
methods were used to estimate the equation.  Evidently, as both the narratives and the equations 
suggests there was a strong association between the condition of the federal treasury and pension 
legislation for veterans. 
     
8. Some Tentative Generalizations 
  Veterans' benefits varied substantially from war to war in the nineteenth century and were 
usually the subject of bitter controversy. Veterans of the War of 1812 received less than veterans of 
either the Revolution or the Mexican War. Union veterans of the Civil War did well compared with 
veterans of earlier wars, but only after a contentious political debate.  
  Several factors account for the differences across wars. Veterans’ benefits evolved, first of all, 
along a path-dependent process. The precedent set by past policies shaped what was considered a 
fair reward for service. Veterans of a given war would point to how veterans of previous wars were 
treated and demand equity. Veterans who served in the militia would point to veterans who had 
served in the regular army and demand equity. Privates and noncommissioned officers would point   37
to the awards made to commissioned officers and demand equity. Opponents of generous benefits 
pointed to what they regarded as abuses of previous systems and demanded greater economy. 
  We would like to believe that feelings toward veterans were independent of the war they 
fought. There are some suggestions in the historical record, however, that the politics of a war 
influenced how and when its veterans were rewarded. This is an inherently difficult proposition to 
prove because the it is not the sort of thing that people involved in the political process are likely to 
talk about. Nevertheless, we can point to several possible examples: (1) In the years immediately 
following the Revolutionary War, veterans of the militia were considered the real heroes, and 
veterans of the Continental Army were sometimes perceived as lesser soldiers, as mere mercenaries. 
With the rise of the image of the suffering soldier, associated especially with Valley Forge, however, 
pressure built for cash benefits for veterans of the Continental Army. (2) Attempts were made to add 
veterans of campaigns carried out against Native Americans in the wake of the Revolution to the 
service pension rolls, but these efforts ran into opposition based partly on the contention that these 
were wars carried out for private gain. (3) The veterans of the War of 1812 received less in cash and 
land than either the veterans of the Revolution or the veterans of the Mexican War. There were a 
number of reasons, but one may have been that the war itself was politically divisive, and went badly 
for the United States. (4) The Mexican War was much more successful from a military point of view 
than the War of 1812. Nevertheless, in the 1880s the veterans of the Mexican War were frustrated on 
some occasions in their campaign for a service pension for political reasons. Republican Congresses 
were unsympathetic to what they regarded as a southern war undertaken by a southern president to 
expand slavery, and fought by men who later served in the Confederate military. (5) Confederate 
veterans, of course, received nothing from the federal government. Even pensioners from antebellum   38
wars who lived in the South during the Civil War had to prove their loyalty during the Civil War to 
remain on the rolls (U.S. Senate 1867). 
  We would also like to believe that veterans’ benefits are independent of fiscal politics. After 
all, since it's founding the United States has been a wealthy nation compared to most other nations, 
and has always been in a position to reward veterans generously whatever the current balance of 
taxes and spending. Nevertheless, in case after case, the state of the treasury was an important 
determinant of the level of benefits: When federal coffers were full, additional benefits were 
provided; when coffers were empty, claims for additional benefits were rejected.  
  Here are some examples. (1) The officers of the Revolutionary Army asked for half-pay for 
life, the practice in the British army. The American officers, however, were forced to settle for bonds 
worth five year's pay at face value. Under the Confederation, moreover, Congress failed to pay the 
interest on the bonds, and many former officers parted with their bonds at a fraction of their face 
value. (2) In 1818, however, after a two-year run of treasury surpluses, The Continental Army’s 
officers and common soldiers in "reduced circumstances" received a lifetime pension. In 1828 and in 
1832, after another run of surpluses that began in 1825, benefits were awarded to veterans without 
regard to their economic status, and in 1836, after the last and largest of these surpluses; widows of 
ordinary soldiers were pensioned, even when the marriage took place after the war. (3) The veterans 
of the War of 1812 were not successful in winning postwar rewards until the Mexican War created 
the precedent for a generous land bounty and, not incidentally, the means – the vast lands won from 
Mexico – for awarding it. The veterans of the War of 1812 eventually qualified for a cash service 
pension in 1871 in the middle of a run of double-digit surpluses. Even in 1871, moreover, 56 years 
after the end of the war, there was some sentiment for means-testing the pension to save expenses. (4) 
The Arrears Act of 1879, which increased the incentives for Civil War veterans to apply for pensions,   39
also was passed during a period of surpluses, and when the surpluses could no longer be defended on 
the grounds that they were needed to deflate prices and restore the gold standard. (5) The Dependent 
Pensions Act of 1890 was passed during a period of large treasury surpluses, and the connection 
with the budget was explicit. The Republicans promised to support a high tariff and to expand 
pension benefits.   
  One might hope that decisions on veterans' benefits would be above politics. In the 
nineteenth-century, at least, the opposite was true. Affection for the veterans as individuals often 
took second place to the politics of war and to current budget realities.  
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Source: Appendix Table A2 and (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ea584, Ea585). 
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Sources: Appendix Table A2 and (Historical Statistics 2006, series Ea584, Ea5853).  46
  
Table 1. Basic War Statistics 
War American   
Revolution 
War of 1812  Mexican War  Civil War 
(Union) 
(1) Start 
  1775  1812 1846 1861 
(2) End 
  1783  1815 1849 1865 
(3) Number Serving 
  217,000
a 286,730  78,718  2,213,363 
(4) Number Serving as a Percent of the Population 
  8.81  3.71 0.37 6.84
b 
(5) Battle Deaths per 1000 
  20.4 7.9  22.0  63.4 
(6) Casualties per 1000 
   n.a.   n.a.  221.5  292.0 
(7) Start of a Service Pension 
  1818  1871 1887 1890 
(8) Service pensions  









aThe exact number is not known. This is the midpoint of figures frequently used by the Department of Defense. 
 
bThe figure is 10.09 percent if the 1,050,000 estimated Confederate soldiers is added. 
 
Sources by Row. (1-6): Historical Statistics 2006, Table Ed1-5. (7): See narrative sections 3-6. (8): Authors' calculation based 
on Table A2 and Historical Statistics 2006, Series Ed327. 
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Appendix: Nineteenth-Century Veterans' Statistics. 
 
For the 1956 edition of Historical Statistics the Veterans Administration made estimates of 
the number of veterans receiving pensions by period of service (in the case of deceased 
veterans their descendants received the benefits) and the amount of expenditures. These 
estimates were carried over in the Bicentennial and Millennial editions. The estimates for the 
nineteenth century, however, were incomplete: There was no information on the number or 
dollar amount of pensions before 1866. More information was given for the postbellum, but 
no distinction was made between pensions for military personnel and pensions for their heirs. 
Some additional data was available in Glasson (1918) who presented separate estimates on 
number of pensions and their dollar value for veterans and heirs for the War of 1812, the 
Mexican War, the Indian Wars, and the Civil War. Glasson also did not present figures for 
the period prior to the Civil War. He also did not present figures for the period after 1866 for 
compensation, except at 5-year intervals, or for Revolutionary war pensions. No estimates 
were presented, moreover, in these sources of the amount of land given to veterans, an 
important source of benefits in the antebellum era. To fill these gaps we made annual 
estimates by period of service for the whole of the nineteenth century of the annual number 
and dollar value of pensions and of the total amount and total dollar value of land. Tables 
A1-A4 contain our estimates.  
  The Number of Pensions.  Table A1, which is divided into A1 and A1 continued, 
shows the number of pensions annually from 1791 until 1900. These estimates were 
compiled mainly from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions. Column (1) 
shows the total number of pensions on the rolls. Columns (2) and (3) show the number of 
pensions awarded as compensation to soldiers or sailors for disabilities incurred while in   53
service – these were known as "invalid pensions" in the nineteenth century – and to widows 
or other dependents as compensation for the death of a soldier or sailor in service. Columns 
(4) and (5) of Table A1 show pensions awarded for service in the Revolution. Table A1 
continued shows the number of pensions awarded for service during the War of 1812, the 
Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Indian Wars. These pensions were awarded after the 
Civil War, so Table A1 continued begins in 1870. 
  There are certain limitations to these series. (1) Each pension was awarded because an 
individual served in the armed forces. In some cases, however, the pensions were divided 
among several descendants. This is the reason the tables refer to the number of “pensions” 
rather than the number of "pensioners." (2) The tables exclude some awards paid as lump 
sums, perhaps because the number on the rolls was meant to serve as a predictor of future 
expenses. The Commissioner of Pensions, moreover, may have missed some pensions paid 
by other federal offices. (3) The rolls listed some pensioners who had died and whose heirs 
were not entitled to a pension. The decrease in the number of pensions in 1841 and 1842 was 
the result of a purging of the names of pensioners assumed to be dead. Despite these 
limitations, we believe the number of pensions provides a good picture of the growth of the 
pension system in the nineteenth century.  
  The series in Table A1 may be of interest for issues aside from those explored in this 
paper. The series showing the number of pensions compensating for death and disability, for 
example, is new, and puts into perspective the amount of fighting in the War of 1812, the 
Seminole War, the Mexican War, and the Civil War. 
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Table A1. The Number of Pensions: Total, Pensions Compensating 
for Death and Disability, and Revolutionary Service Pensions, 1791-
1900. 
 
Compensation for Death or 











  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
1791 1,356  NA  NA  0  0 
1792 1,472  NA  NA  0  0 
1793 NA  NA  NA  0  0 
1794 NA  NA  NA  0  0 
1795 1,444  NA  NA  0  0 
1796  NA NA  NA  0  0 
1797  NA NA  NA  0  0 
1798  NA NA  NA  0  0 
1799  NA NA  NA  0  0 
1800  1,711 NA  NA  0  0 
1801  NA NA  22  0  0 
1802  1,661 NA  NA  0  0 
1803  NA NA  37  0  0 
1804  NA NA  37  0  0 
1805  1,593 1,544  49  0  0 
1806  NA NA  65  0  0 
1807  1,530 1,452  78  0  0 
1808 NA  NA  85  0  0 
1809 NA  NA  90  0  0 
1810 1,544  1,451  93  0  0 
1811 NA  NA  107  0  0 
1812 NA  NA  122  0  0 
1813 1,501  1,353  148  0  0 
1814 NA  NA  176  0  0 
1815 2,050  1,798  252  0  0 
1816 3,597  3,345  252  0  0 
1817 3,658  3,300  358  0  0 
1818 12,350  3,814  358  8,178  0 
1819 22,189  NA  438  16,270  0 
1820 NA  NA  480  16,355  0 
1821 NA  NA  191  13,968  0   55
Table A1. The Number of Pensions: Total, Pensions Compensating 
for Death and Disability, and Revolutionary Service Pensions, 1791-
1900. 
 
Compensation for Death or 











  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
1822 NA  NA  431  12,071  0 
1823 17,254  3,870  423  12,961  0 
1824 17,496  3,736  524  13,236  0 
1825 17,194  3,743  524  12,927  0 
1826 17,068  3,805  533  12,730  0 
1827 16,858  3,805  534  12,519  0 
1828 16,447  3,786  270  12,391  0 
1829 16,591  3,794  596  12,201  0 
1830 16,484  3,873  536  12,075  0 
1831 16,280  3,868  536  11,876  0 
1832 NA  3,806  NA  13,883  0 
1833 NA  3,875  NA  34,472  0 
1834 NA  3,940  NA  38,544  0 
1835 41,445  3,893  442  37,110  0 
1836 41,718  4,044  466  37,208  0 
1837 42,446  4,116  678  36,187  1,465 
1838 42,717  4,200  847  34,440  3,230 
1839 44,875  4,236  901  32,925  6,813 
1840 45,308  4,289  914  31,759  8,346 
1841 32,831  2,605  959  21,076  8,194 
1842 26,016  2,662  981  19,671  2,702 
1843 28,254  2,720  566  18,774  6,194 
1844 29,544  2,778  540  17,733  8,493 
1845 28,894  2,834  728  16,002  9,330 
1846 28,352  2,949  752  15,460  9,191 
1847 23,798  2,946  780  12,388  7,684 
1848 16,216  3,126  930  9,031  3,129 
1849 22,319  6,119  999  9,017  6,184 
1850 21,472  6,766  1,097  6,932  6,677 
1851 22,875  7,109  1,228  6,324  8,214 
1852 20,156  8,086  1,288  5,502  5,280   56
Table A1. The Number of Pensions: Total, Pensions Compensating 
for Death and Disability, and Revolutionary Service Pensions, 1791-
1900. 
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  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
1853 15,097  7,564  999  1,466  5,068 
1854 15,082  7,014  1,017  1,069  5,982 
1855 14,468  7,352  838  726  5,552 
1856 13,914  7,397  836  514  5,167 
1857 13,287  7,290  949  346  4,702 
1858 11,615  6,261  892  253  4,209 
1859 11,585  6,788  918  165  3,714 
1860 11,284  7,052  939  89  3,204 
1861 10,709  6,961  957  63  2,728 
1862 8,159  5,363  916  30  1,850 
1863 14,780  12,068  1,121  18  1,573 
1864 51,135  48,200  1,505  12  1,418 
1865 85,986  83,013  1,856  3  1,114 
1866 126,722  123,577  2,213  1  931 
1867 155,474  152,096  2,381  0  997 
1868 169,643  166,136  2,618  1  888 
1869 188,850  185,125  2,838  0  887 
1870 199,413  195,739  2,947  0  727 
1871 208,129  203,718  3,050  0  634 
1872 232,700  208,923  3,179  0  471 
1873 238,411  211,447  3,200  0  445 
1874 236,241  209,563  3,336  0  410 
1875 234,821  209,984  3,420  0  379 
1876 232,137  209,237  3,387  0  320 
1877 232,104  210,992  3,439  0  262 
1878 223,998  206,071  3,558  0  237 
1879 242,755  206,111  3,616  0  213 
1880 250,802  211,795  3,930  0  189   57
Table A1. The Number of Pensions: Total, Pensions Compensating 
for Death and Disability, and Revolutionary Service Pensions, 1791-
1900. 
 
Compensation for Death or 











  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
1881 268,830  229,542  4,195  0  166 
1882 285,697  249,442  4,316  0  144 
1883 303,658  272,893  4,375  0  123 
1884 322,756  294,688  4,554  0  104 
1885 345,125  320,211  4,671  0  86 
1886 365,783  345,947  4,831  0  69 
1887 406,007  379,401  5,254  0  54 
1888 452,557  413,865  5,898  0  37 
1889 489,725  449,045  6,813  0  29 
1890 537,944  497,240  7,734  0  25 
1891 676,160  522,134  8,017  0  23 
1892 876,068  498,406  7,646  0  22 
1893 966,012  468,564  7,365  0  17 
1894 969,544  461,008  7,153  0  12 
1895 970,524  453,172  7,201  0  12 
1896 970,678  442,460  7,210  0  14 
1897 976,014  431,564  7,163  0  16 
1898 993,714  420,280  7,133  0  12 
1899 991,519  408,084  7,014  0  11 
1900 993,529  395,089  6,936  0  11 
 
aBeginning in 1893 this column includes nurses.  
 
Sources: Column (1) is the sum of (2) through (5) of Table A1 and (6) through 
(13) of Table A1 continued.  (2), (4), and (5) were compiled from the Annual 
Reports of the Pension Office.  (3) through 1840 is from Clark, Craig, and 
Wilson (2003, 55); 1841-1900 is from the Annual Reports of the Pension Office.  
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Table A1 continued. Pensions for Service in the War of 1812, Mexican War, Civil War, and Indian Wars, 
1871-1900. 
 

















  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1871  683  44  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1872  17,100  3,027  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1873  18,266  5,053  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1874  17,620  5,312  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1875  15,875  5,163  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1876  14,206  4,987  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1877  12,802  4,609  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1878  10,407  3,725  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1879  11,621  21,194  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1880  10,138  24,750  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1881  8,898  26,029  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1882  7,134  24,661  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1883  4,931  21,336  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1884  3,898  19,512  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1885  2,945  17,212  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1886  1,539  13,397  0 0 0 0 0 0 
1887  1,069  11,831  7,503  895  0 0 0 0 
1888  806  10,787  16,060  5,104  0 0 0 0   59
1889  603  9,964  17,065  6,206  0 0 0 0 
1890  413  8,610  17,158  6,764  0 0 0 0 
1891 284 7,590  16,379  6,976  101,112  13,645 0  0 
1892 165 6,651  15,215  7,282  293,068  47,613 0  0 
1893  86  5,425 14,149 7,369  377,202  81,952 2,544  1,338 
1894  45  4,447 13,461 7,686  375,084  94,260 3,104  3,284 
1895  21  3,826  12,586  7,868 378,115  100,800 3,012  3,911 
1896  14  3,287  11,800  8,017 383,818  107,103 2,718  4,237 
1897  7  2,810  10,922  8,072 392,440  116,359 2,373  4,288 
1898  3  2,407  10,012  8,143 413,909  125,729 2,019  4,067 
1899  1  1,998  9,204  8,175 420,912  130,266 1,656  3,899 
1900  1  1,742  8,352  8,151 430,657  135,726 1,370  3,739 
 
Sources: Columns (6) through (13) were compiled from the Annual Reports of the Pension Office. 
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 Cash  payments.  For the years up to 1865, we relied on The Statement of Annual 
Appropriations and Expenditures for Army and Navy Pensions, March 4, 1789, to June 30, 
1876 (U.S. Senate 1877). We checked these figures against the figures in the Annual Reports 
of the Commissioner of Pensions. In broad terms the figures in the two sources agree, 
although there are many small discrepancies that may be the result of accounting differences. 
There are also a number of differences between Historical Statistics (2006 series Ea643) and 
column 1 of Table A2. The former seems to have been carried over from the 1876 Finance 
Report. The Senate document (1876, 30-31) explains the differences between its estimates 
and those in the Finance Report. The main differences are that the Senate document includes 
expenditures made by the Naval and Privateer Pension Funds, excludes certain transfers 
made to Virginia to settle claims for previous payments to veterans, and includes a number of 
miscellaneous expenditures. On the whole, the Senate series would appear to give a more 
accurate account of current spending. There are still probably omissions. 
  Beginning in 1866 we relied on the estimates of total spending in Historical Statistics 
(2006, series Ed297) and Glasson (1918). Glasson compiled the data from the Annual 
Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions for the War of 1812 (p. 113), the Indian Wars (p. 
115), the Mexican War (p. 119), and the law of 1890 (p.271). We also included annual 
estimates from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions for expenditures for 
general compensation since Glasson (1918, 144) only included estimates at 5-year intervals, 
and for the Revolutionary War pensions which Glasson omitted.    61
 
Table A2. Cash Expenditures for Veterans Benefits by Period of Service, 
1791-1900 (dollars) 
 Total  Compensation 
for Death and 
Disability
a 
Revolutionary War  
Service Pensions 
War of 1812 
Service 
Pensions 





  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1791 $175,814  $175,814  $0  $0  $0 
1792 109,243  109,243  0  0  0 
1793 80,088  80,088  0  0  0 
1794 81,399  81,399  0  0  0 
1795 68,673  68,673  0  0  0 
1796  100,844 100,844  0  0  0 
1797  92,257 92,257  0  0  0 
1798  104,845 104,845  0  0  0 
1799  95,444 95,444  0  0  0 
1800  94,015 94,015  0  0  0 
1801  124,688 124,688  0  0  0 
1802  126,080 126,080  0  0  0 
1803  62,902 62,902  0  0  0 
1804  80,093 80,093  0  0  0 
1805  81,855 81,855  0  0  0 
1806  82,084 82,084  0  0  0 
1807  70,500 70,500  0  0  0 
1808 82,576  82,576  0  0  0 
1809 87,834  87,834  0  0  0 
1810 83,744  83,744  0  0  0 
1811 82,150  82,150  0  0  0 
1812 91,880  91,880  0  0  0 
1813 213,373  213,373  0  0  0 
1814 248,254  248,254  0  0  0 
1815 178,104  178,104  0  0  0 
1816 286,056  286,056  0  0  0   62
Table A2. Cash Expenditures for Veterans Benefits by Period of Service, 
1791-1900 (dollars) 
 Total  Compensation 
for Death and 
Disability
a 
Revolutionary War  
Service Pensions 
War of 1812 
Service 
Pensions 





  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1817 426,480  426,480  0  0  0 
1818 972,361  672,361  300,000  0  0 
1819 2,416,829  568,928  1,847,901  0  0 
1820 3,218,495  452,055  2,766,440  0  0 
1821 244,779  244,779  0  0  0 
1822 1,947,968  305,377  1,642,591  0  0 
1823 1,778,760  329,663  1,449,097  0  0 
1824 1,355,069  87,469  1,267,600  0  0 
1825 1,384,625  75,815  1,308,811  0  0 
1826 1,560,891  255,696  1,305,195  0  0 
1827 978,341  182,329  796,013  0  0 
1828 850,574  127,439  723,135  0  0 
1829 934,070  169,577  764,492  0  0 
1830 1,356,797  267,769  1,089,028  0  0 
1831 1,031,931  26,096  1,005,836  0  0 
1832 1,343,478  284,605  1,058,873  0  0 
1833 4,589,751  294,890  4,294,861  0  0 
1834 3,363,391  246,198  3,117,193  0  0 
1835 1,929,240  116,944  1,812,296  0  0 
1836 2,832,787  277,051  2,555,737  0  0 
1837 2,432,578  -36,165  1,916,769  551,973  0 
1838 2,303,617  417,250  836,608  1,049,759  0 
1839 3,126,864  255,376  1,280,425  1,591,063  0 
1840 2,623,520  272,272  1,211,760  1,139,488  0 
1841 2,504,384  380,176  1,120,037  1,004,171  0 
1842 1,467,011  343,257  769,674  354,080  0 
1843 857,073  123,440  498,023  235,610  0 
1844 2,027,442  189,971  1,090,237  747,234  0   63
Table A2. Cash Expenditures for Veterans Benefits by Period of Service, 
1791-1900 (dollars) 
 Total  Compensation 
for Death and 
Disability
a 
Revolutionary War  
Service Pensions 
War of 1812 
Service 
Pensions 





  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1845 2,500,748  253,548  790,040  1,457,160  0 
1846 1,905,335  253,280  540,552  1,111,504  0 
1847 1,837,124  301,807  416,227  1,119,090  0 
1848 1,290,840  237,541  280,099  773,200  0 
1849 1,246,281  317,157  191,145  737,979  0 
1850 1,622,385  496,626  304,165  821,594  0 
1851 2,226,569  598,760  270,997  1,356,812  0 
1852 2,382,872  603,911  442,284  1,336,677  0 
1853 1,736,262  529,006  221,356  985,900  0 
1854 1,232,368  492,703  -118,641  858,306  0 
1855 1,473,599  535,788  24,249  913,563  0 
1856 1,296,230  503,443  43,325  749,462  0 
1857 1,310,381  711,373  140,750  458,258  0 
1858 1,219,768  663,263  78,931  477,575  0 
1859 1,222,223  779,817  7,671  434,735  0 
1860 1,100,802  661,121  18,735  420,947  0 
1861 1,032,768  659,588  23,208  349,972  0 
1862 852,170  541,098  35,620  275,452  0 
1863 1,078,513  806,091  24,970  247,452  0 
1864 4,985,274  4,620,967  0  364,307  0 
1865 16,338,155  15,989,116  0  349,039  0 
1866 15,858,000  15,741,369  125  116,505  0 
1867 21,276,000  21,139,565  0  136,435  0 
1868 24,164,000  24,037,371  142  126,487  0 
1869 29,658,000  29,518,043  0  139,957  0 
1870 30,543,000  30,431,242  0  111,758  0 
1871 30,081,000  29,986,022  0  91,912  2,555 
1872 31,454,000  29,076,697  0  63,794  1,977,515   64
Table A2. Cash Expenditures for Veterans Benefits by Period of Service, 
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 Total  Compensation 
for Death and 
Disability
a 
Revolutionary War  
Service Pensions 
War of 1812 
Service 
Pensions 





  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1873 28,681,000  25,859,556  0  53,534  2,078,607 
1874 31,908,000  29,647,774  0  55,377  1,588,833 
1875 31,106,000  29,167,195  0  50,205  1,355,600 
1876 29,887,000  28,310,991  0  41,199  1,089,037 
1877 30,145,000  28,848,793  0  0  934,658 
1878 28,764,000  27,700,509  0  0  768,918 
1879 35,526,000  32,318,775  0  0  1,014,526 
1880 58,585,000  55,136,231  0  0  790,710 
1881 52,771,000  49,767,586  0  0  621,613 
1882 56,882,000  54,379,518  0  0  478,275 
1883 64,361,000  62,121,123  0  0  357,335 
1884 62,184,000  60,218,809  0  0  278,889 
1885 70,196,000  68,470,015  0  0  207,783 
1886 68,931,000  67,327,714  0  0  144,390 
1887 79,451,000  77,523,884  0  0  105,837 
1888 84,512,000  80,396,923  0  0  73,659 
1889 95,066,000  91,125,241  0  0  52,800 
1890 112,647,000  108,921,831  0  0  38,847 
1891 125,351,000  113,063,145  0  0  22,505 
1892 147,784,000  93,425,047  0  0  11,909 
1893 165,315,000  93,966,832  0  0  10,494 
1894 147,408,000  85,830,628  0  0  5,312 
1895 147,606,000  84,953,908  0  0  3,583 
1896 145,789,000  84,011,962  0  0  1,972 
1897 147,903,000  83,059,120  0  0  1,440 
1898 152,814,000  83,541,420  0  0  791 
1899 146,822,000  79,712,387  0  0  193 
1900 146,887,000  78,538,922  0  0  96   65
Table A2. Cash Expenditures for Veterans Benefits by Period of Service, 
1791-1900 (dollars) 
 Total  Compensation 
for Death and 
Disability
a 
Revolutionary War  
Service Pensions 
War of 1812 
Service 
Pensions 





  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
a This column includes some expenditures from the Naval Pension Fund and Privateer 
Pension Fund that may have been service pensions rather than compensation. 
 
Sources:  1791-1865: (U.S. Senate 1877). 1866-1900, column (1): (Historical Statistics 
2006, series Ed297); columns 2-4: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions; 
column 5, Glasson (1918, 113). 
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Table A2 continued. Cash Expenditures for Veterans’ Benefits by Period of 
Service, 1791-1900 (dollars) 
 
Year  War of 1812  Indian Wars  Mexican War  Civil War 









 (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
1871  $511  $0  $0 $0 $0  $0  $0 
1872  335,994  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1873  689,304  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1874  616,016  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1875  533,000  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1876  445,773  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1877  361,549  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1878  294,572  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1879  2,192,700  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1880  2,658,058  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1881  2,381,801  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1882  2,024,208  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1883  1,882,542  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1884  1,686,302  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1885  1,518,202  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1886  1,458,896  0  0 0 0  0  0 
1887 1,765,582  0  0  53,149  2,548  0  0 
1888 1,596,605  0  0  1,861,756 583,056  0  0 
1889 1,397,487  0  0  1,796,899 693,572  0  0 
1890 1,263,239  0  0  1,728,028 695,055  0  0 
1891 1,040,284  0  0  1,622,115 695,315 7,812,108  1,095,529 
1892 827,081  0  0  1,425,258  686,734  43,845,071 7,562,900 
1893  721,060  158,076 66,434 1,396,392  736,173  54,568,610 13,690,927 
1894  645,297  377,884 456,652 1,388,707 803,346 45,062,151  12,838,023 
1895  541,923  308,365 460,161 1,433,691 802,033 46,478,227  12,624,108 
1896  456,848  268,778 468,694 1,368,686 814,096 45,257,663  13,140,301 
1897  388,292  227,580 442,083 1,279,188 818,564 46,514,122  15,172,610 
1898  347,070  189,981 418,997 1,213,509 846,560 49,947,222  16,308,449 
1899  293,097  165,327 403,872 1,107,595 818,068 49,045,132  15,276,329 
1900  248,913  138,143 379,035 1,011,504 804,308 50,431,124  15,334,956 
 
Sources:  Glasson (1918, 113, 115, 119, 271).   67
 
  Land Grants. Table A3 shows a preliminary estimate of the amount of land awarded 
to veterans of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. We started 
with 2,666,080 acres awarded by the Continental Congress and the federal government 
(Gates 1968, 276; Weber and Schmeckebier 1934, 451). We then added the amounts awarded 
by the states cited in Gates (1968): New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia (and Indiana), and 
Georgia. Gates did not include figures for four other states that granted land: Massachusetts 
(and Maine after it became a separate state), Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
26 
For these states we included a rough estimate equal to .497 times the amount awarded by the 
states for which we had estimates. The ratio .497 was based on bounties listed on 10 pages 
randomly selected from Bockstruck (1996). Although small, the sample contains 469 records, 
and the ratio quickly settled in the neighborhood of one half. The total awarded to veterans of 
the Revolution, according to the last line of Table A3, was 16,599,283 acres, of which only 
16 percent came from the Continental Congress and federal government, while 37 percent 
came from the extraordinary grants made by Virginia to its veterans. 
  Our estimate for the veterans of the War of 1812, based on the legislation passed 
during and immediately after the war, is 4,891,000 acres (Gates 1968, 276; Weber and 
Schmeckebier 1934, 451). To estimate the amount of the land awarded to veterans of the War 
of 1812 after the Mexican War we relied on James W. Oberly (1990). Oberly's Table 4 (1990, 
18) shows a distribution of land warrants by period of service under the Act of 1850 based on 
a sample of warrants, Table 5 (Oberly 1990, 20) shows a distribution for the Act of 1852, and 
Table 6 (Oberly 1990, 22) shows a distribution for the Act of 1855. We blew up the sample 
                                                 
26 New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut, apparently, did not grant land to veterans. 
Connecticut, however, did award land to citizens as compensation for property damaged during the 
Revolution.   68
estimates by 200 (Oberly's sampling ratio) to produce estimates of the total amount of acres 
transferred to veterans by period of service (War of 1812, Mexican War, and other 19
th 
century conflicts) under each law.  
  To estimate the amount of land awarded to veterans of the Mexican War we also 
included the amount of land awarded under the Law of 1847 (Oberly 1990, 3) in addition to 
the estimates for the Mexican War derived from Tables 4, 5, 6. The total amount issued to 
veterans of the Mexican War, 16,885,640 acres, is less than the total amount issued to 
veterans of War of 1812 after the Mexican War, 34,304,000 acres, because more soldiers 
served in the War of 1812 (Table 1). The estimate of land per veteran for the Mexican War in 
Figure 5 was computed by dividing the total amount of land awarded to veterans of the 
Mexican War by the standard estimates of the number who served (Table 1). This results in a 
rather large acreage per veteran. We do not have a definitive explanation for this anomaly. It 
is possible that some men who received bounties did not actually join the expeditionary force 
and proceed to Mexico.  
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Table A3. Land Awarded to Veterans of the Antebellum Wars (acres) 
 
Revolutionary War 
Continental Congress and the Federal 
government  2,666,080 




Other Land Bounty States  4,634,086 
Total 16,599,283 
War of 1812 
Awards made before the Mexican War  4,891,000 




Native American Wars 
Total 10,062,000 
All Antebellum Wars 
Total 82,741,923 
Sources and Notes. Revolutionary War: Gates (1968, 276). This figure is also given in 
Weber and Schmeckebier (1934, 451).  New York: We multiplied the 2,045 officers and 
privates entitled to land (Gates 1968, 255) by 500 acres, the minimum entitlement. 
Pennsylvania: We added two tracts reserved for veterans, Gates (1968, 253, 253 ftn. 11). 
Virginia: Gates (1968, 257). This is a lower bound estimate that combines the amount of 
federal land office scrip that was exchanged for Virginia warrants and the amount of 
Virginia land warrants located in the Virginia Military Track in Ohio. It omits warrants 
located in Kentucky. Georgia: Gates (1968, 253). Other Bounty Land States (Massachusetts, 
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina): 49.7% of the total for New York, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia based on a sample of bounties from Bockstruck (1996), 
a comprehensive list of warrants issued by state governments. War of 1812, original grants: 
Gates (1968, 276); Weber and Schmeckebier (1934, 451). War of 1812, post Mexican War 
grants: Oberly (1990, 18, 20, 22). Mexican War: Oberly (1990, 3, 18, 20, 22). See the text of 
the appendix for additional details. Native American Wars: Oberly (1990, 18, 20, 22). 
Grants by state governments are excluded except for the Revolutionary War. 
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The Value of the Land Grants. The estimates cited in the text of the value of land grants 
in the antebellum era are back-of-the-envelope calculations intended only to provide a 
sense of relative magnitudes. For the Revolution we started with our estimate of total 
land grants to revolutionary officers and soldiers from Table A3. We assumed that 30 
percent of these grants were sold in the first year after the war, 25 percent in the second 
year, and so on. We priced land at $.50 per acre. Stanley Lebergott (1985, 186) used 
$1.00 per acre for federal land circa 1800. Farley Grubb (2005, 25-26) zeros in on the 
same figure. Discussions of the revolutionary land grants, however, stress that most of the 
land was sold to speculators at relatively low prices before 1800, hence the lower 
estimate. We then deflated by a cost of living index (Historical Statistics 2006, series Cc2) 
to put the resulting value in 1860 dollars and computed the present value at the end of the 
war at 6 percent. The final figure was $6,179,593. A slower schedule of sales, in which 
only 25 percent of the land was disposed of in the first year after the war, yielded a figure 
of $4,654,508.  
  To estimate the value of the land bounties awarded to veterans of the War of 1812, 
we started with the estimates in Table A3. We assumed that the warrants issued during 
the war were generally disposed of quickly after the war was over, 40 percent in the first 
year, 30 percent in the second year, 20 percent in the third year, and 10 percent in the 
fifth year. The assumption of rapid disposal is consistent with most descriptions of the 
process. We then multiplied the amount disposed of in each year by a rough estimate of 
$.72 per acre (Oberly 1990, 9-10). This is very likely an upper bound estimate. The 
nominal amounts received in each year were then deflated by the consumer price index 
and the present value was taken in 1815 at 6 percent.     71
  The estimates of the value of the warrants issued to veterans of the War of 1812 
after the Mexican War and the warrants issued to the veterans of the Mexican War were 
computed analogously. We assumed that 40 percent of the warrants were disposed of in 
the first year, 30 percent in the following year, 20 percent in the year after that, and 10 
percent in the fifth year after the war. We then multiplied the acreage figures disposed of 
in each year by Oberly's estimate of the value of land warrants (1990, Table 28, 170). We 
then deflated these figures by the cost of living index (Historical Statistics 2006, series 
Cc2) and discounted them at 6 percent to the end of the War of 1812 or the end of the 
Mexican War as appropriate.  
Table A4: Present Value of Land Awarded to Veterans in 1860 
Dollars at 6 Percent 
 
War Total  Per  Veteran 
Revolutionary War  $6,179,593  $28.00 
War of 1812 (Immediately after the 
War)  1,601,260 5.58 
War of 1812 (After Mexican War)  4,778,271  8.50 
Mexican War  22,348,881  136.52 
 
Sources. Quantity of Land: Table A3. Prices of Land: Lebergott (1985, 186), 
Grubb (2005, 25-26), Oberly (1990, 9-10, 170). See the discussion in the 
Appendix for more details. 
 
 
 
 